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For a women's historian working on the antebellum period, the "cult of true 
womanhood" or the notion of "separate spheres" looms as an ever present, 
inescapable, even archetypal framework. As Linda Kerber has suggested, the 
trope of separate spheres has in fact determined the boundaries of the entire field 
of American women's history, because it simultaneously carved a space for 
women in the current historiography and a place for feminist inquiry in the 
historical profession. Nevertheless, many women's historians have questioned 
this ruling paradigm. Kerber notes that spheres operates as a spatial metaphor in 
much of the existing scholarship, which in turn frames women as historical 
subjects within a rigid dualism and insular conceptual domain.1 Nancy Hewitt, 
bell hooks, and Christine Stansell have further demonstrated how race, class, and 
religion cut deep divisions—physical, material, and ideological—that make the 
unifying logic of women's sphere seem contradictory, if not illusionary.2 In its 
place, historians have turned to the category of gender, which is not new to 
feminist scholars, but which has emerged as the most promising theoretical 
departure, especially for those scholars interested in expanding the range of topics 
explored by women's historians. Joan Scott added a new—and to some degree 
controversial—dimension to the meaning of gender by urging women's histori-
ans to embrace poststructuralist theory as well.3 In this paper, I plan to review 
Scott's definition of gender, focusing on its strengths, possible pitfalls, and 
omissions. In the course of doing so, I will assess how several of the most 
influential studies of "separate spheres" elide the issues raised by poststructuralism. 
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Finally, I shall address the feminist underpinnings of these works, because neither 
Scott nor Kerber fully evaluates the politics of women's history. 
Published in 1986, Scott's article, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical 
Analysis," is a rallying-cry for women's historians to adopt "theoretical formu-
lations" that could "transform... dominant disciplinary concepts." This is indeed 
a bold proposition. Accordingly, Scott argues that gender has not been treated as 
an analytical category, but instead has fallen short of this task for several reasons. 
Since historians tend to write narrative accounts of the past, those interested in 
women follow this tradition and use gender mainly as a descriptive device. The 
inadequacy of this approach, as Scott contends, can be seen in the accumulation 
of case studies on women that have quantitatively expanded what is known about 
the field, but have not qualitatively changed how most historians explain the 
fundamental "truths" of "History." Despite the sophistication and subtlety of the 
scholarship in women's history, Scott believes that the field will remain 
marginalized until efforts are made to place gender at the center of the most 
traditional of intellectual arenas—namely, the realm of political history. Scott 
offers a twofold plan to achieve this goal. First, historians must reconsider exactly 
how they define gender, recognizing that gender is based not only on "perceived 
differences between the sexes," but also on "signifying relationships of power." 
Second, historians must not limit their explanations of gender only to the social 
experiences of women; they must instead view gender as part of a larger system 
of relationships that link together the forces of ideology, normative behavior, 
political action, and identity formation.4 
Scott presents a temptingly simple agenda for the future of women's history. 
Through a more rigorous and theoretically informed definition of gender, 
scholars will break through the glass ceiling by analyzing and reformulating the 
essential concerns of contemporary historians. But Scott does not explain how 
gender might replace such dominant paradigms as "separate spheres" or the "cult 
of true womanhood." This is in part because her initial definition of the problem 
leaves many unresolved questions. Can gender alone recast the goals of women's 
history? And to what degree should gender be informed by the theoretical insights 
of feminism? 
Whether gender can assume the role mapped out by Scott is debatable. One 
difficulty emerges from her historical survey of the word itself. Scott notes that 
gender is derived from a grammatical practice which allows for distinctions 
between different word groups, but she does not offer an explanation for why and 
how the system of classification evolved. Nor does Scott consider the connection 
between gender and genre, a term which denotes a type, species, or class of 
composition with distinctive properties or conventions.5 Instead, Scott's defini-
tion of gender is generic—she offers a list of potential attributes without exploring 
the limitations of transforming a grammatical distinction into a category of 
historical analysis. Scott identifies four major attributes of gender: its symbolic, 
political, and normative functions, as well as its role in identify formation. But 
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if gender operates as a catalogue of component parts, then questions arise over 
what determines the connection between these parts. Is one feature such as the 
symbolic granted more analytical weight than another, such as normative 
behavior? Is it even appropriate to distinguish normative behavior from symbolic 
action, thereby concealing how ideological forces and the imaginary or uncon-
scious might link them together? And what happens if one attribute like identity 
formation is more closely linked to the past usages of gender? My point is that 
a system of classification is not a theoretical exposition, so the effort to condense 
other, more developed theoretical positions into a single category like gender may 
actually inhibit certain kinds of analysis. 
There is another way to look at Scott's insistence that gender is about 
"processes" or interrelationships and cannot be reduced to the "search for single 
origins."6 Here her penchant for classification could be viewed not only as a 
search for a stable set of characteristics, but as an attempt to ensure that the 
category of gender is critically evaluated when scholars use it in their work. 
Breaking with the tradition that gender is tied to its origin in a particular 
capacity—usually biological and sexual roles—Scott suggests that gender is 
defined in relation to other cultural and ideological forms. In effect, gender 
depends less on essential attributes than on its social function within a given 
historical period. This perspective does more than dismiss an essentialist view of 
gender; it also implies that gender relations are not a mere reflection of things as 
they are, but active constructions through which meaning is constantly trans-
formed and reproduced. 
Taken together, these views suggest that Scott' s agenda is double-edged. On 
the one hand, the impetus for classification can provide for more detailed 
accounts of gender systems, but it does not preclude the possibility of relying on 
description rather than explanation. Though Scott chides women's historians for 
being "more comfortable with description than theory," her proposal does not 
necessarily solve the problem.7 The act of giving gender a more rigorous 
definition does not protect it from misuse or from reproducing the problems found 
in its deeply ideological past. Historians may argue that gender is constructed and 
even detail the process, but with a single category of analysis, they might not 
unpack its persistent and complicated relation to the overdetermined category of 
sex which is subsumed under gender.8 On the other hand, Scott's effort to 
dismantle the implied unity between the function and value of gender relations is 
significant, because it forces historians to adopt a dual perspective in which 
function and value might be subject to different, if not contradictory, social and 
ideological determinations. The critical point here is to reject the assumption that 
value follows function—or that the meanings ascribed to gender relations are 
always reducible to the fundamental functions of sex and reproduction—or to its 
cultural artifacts of heterosexuality, marriage, family, home, and domesticity. 
Scott is well aware of the major trends in feminist theory, but her review of 
the current feminist scholarship unduly emphasizes the disadvantages rather than 
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the advantages of applying these approaches to historical analysis. Theories of 
patriarchy, Scott concludes, ignore other forms of oppression and place too much 
importance on physical differences as a universal and ahistorical condition. 
Marxist feminists privilege economic causality, and for Scott they seem less 
capable of granting gender "an independent analytical status of its own." 
Psychoanalytic theory is unappealing to Scott because of its narrow focus on 
family dynamics, the early stages of child development, or the conscious and 
unconscious construction of the gendered subject. Here again Scott finds the 
issues posed by theories of identity and subjectivity to be hampered by the 
tendency to universalize and reify sexual differences.9 
Scott's wholesale dismissal of feminist theory seems strangely at odds with 
her advocacy of theory, especially because she rejects these traditions mainly on 
historical grounds. In contrast to feminist theory, history is portrayed as if it had 
never succumbed to the error of generating universals truths, reifying sexual 
differences, or constructing historical subjects out of ideological cloth. The 
problem with Scott's strategy is its unarticulated political assertion that gender 
(carefully distanced from a less appealing feminist past) is the foundation on 
which to rebuild the field of women's history. The added irony is Scott's 
invocation of Michel Foucault's notion of power as "fields of force": she implies 
that his theory of dispersed power can serve as a substitute for patriarchy, in which 
power is located in systems of male dominance.10 Yet Scott's selective appropria-
tion of Foucault's theory of power must be juxtaposed to what she chooses to 
ignore from Foucault's formidable critique of history. What Scott ignores is 
Foucault's challenge not only to a part but to the entire tradition called "History." 
Dismantling the logic of History (its practices, functions, strategies, and value-
systems, as well as its relation to knowledge as power) represents a very different 
approach to theory than simply adding a new category to the existing historical 
scholarship. 
Several of Foucault's themes have direct relevance to feminist concerns, 
especially the critique of universals, neutrality, objectivity, and the will to truth 
embodied in the humanist approach to history.11 The subject of history has been 
Man, according to Foucault, and the ability to question this "founding subject" 
can be useful to women ' s historians.12 In regard to the theory of power, moreover, 
Foucault has not only cast power as dispersed; he has also challenged the 
traditional view that power is primarily exercised by the state through acts of overt 
political oppression or punishment. According to Foucault, power does not 
always originate in political institutions, display its force, or generate fear as a 
means of social control. By masking its full effect though its distribution to the 
"infinitesimal level of individual lives," power can be made more tolerable, 
because its invasions are less obvious and concrete, and because its various forms 
are rarely identified with a single institution.13 Foucault's portrayal of modern 
disciplinary power as anonymous (everywhere and nowhere) thus offers a critical 
insight into women's subordination: self-regulation, compliance, even consent 
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must be reevaluated not as individual choices but as acts that may be uncon-
sciously shaped through the dispersion of informal disciplinary rules and prac-
tices.14 Such a perspective not only challenges the monolithic image of patriar-
chal authority, but it also exposes a more fundamental feature of male domina-
tion: namely, the rationalization that women are not really oppressed because 
they have freely chosen to benefit from male protection, heterosexuality, domes-
ticity, the sanctuary of the private sphere.15 * 
Obviously, these issues are useful in assessing the dominant model of 
"separate spheres" in American women's history. Contrary to Kerber's review 
of the field, I do not believe that women's history has moved through three stages, 
nor do I think that each stage has been marked improvements or corrections of 
earlier works. In fact, the shifts in women's history from Barbara Welter's 1966 
essay, "The Cult of true womanhood," to Nancy Cott' s The Bonds ofWomanhood 
in 1976, to Suzanne Lebsock's 1984 The Free Women of Petersburg, suggest 
dramatic changes informed by radically different—but not progressively im-
proved—theories of feminism, history, sexual difference, power and ideology. 
Interestingly enough, Welter's essay has been misread as both naming the 
problem of separate spheres and perpetuating its negative side as a model of 
female victimization. While Kerber acknowledged Welter's wit and subtlety, she 
concluded that her "judgement of the separate sphere was a negative one . . . . 
which denigrated women, kept them subordinate."16 Other women's historians 
similarly agreed that Welter discussed only prescriptive values and roles for 
women, which was of course contrasted to a different and less constrictive reality 
which women constructed for themselves.17 Nancy Cott also charged Welter with 
treating feminism and domesticity as opposites, and with identifying domesticity 
as a form of women's oppression. Not surprisingly, Cott's own study sought to 
"judge domesticity on its own terms," by which she meant examining "women's 
discovery and creation of psychic and social resources in their given situations." 
In her reformulation, domesticity operated as a more "flexible" space which, 
instead of restricting women's lives, actually allowed for their liberation, creativ-
ity, and self-discovery.18 
Cott, however, never judged Welter's work "on its own terms," which was 
impossible to do anyway because Cott's own project involved disarming the 
critical side of Welter's work. Cott implied that her approach to domesticity was 
more objective, neutral, fair, and balanced, because she avoided moral judgments 
and instead offered a more flexible and fluid context for interpreting the meaning 
of separate spheres.19 Yet Cott's study was not any more objective or neutral than 
Welter's: her model was adapted from the twentieth-century variety of feminism 
which focused on gender identity through "consciousness-raising" and sister-
hood. As far as her methodological approach, Cott constructed domesticity from 
an idealist and instrumental perspective in which ideology (here she means a 
collection of ideas and beliefs) provided women with the necessary intellectual 
tools for refashioning the image of womanhood. 
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By reading the personal papers of "nonfamous women," Cott also assumed 
that she had uncovered a more honest, personal, and less ideologically complicit 
source for understanding domesticity.20 According to Cott, domesticity origi-
nates from the separation of women's work within the private sphere of the 
family. Although Cott claims not to view women as "totally the mistresses of their 
destinies," she inevitably stresses how domesticity unleashed for women a new 
"vocation" and even the "assertion of new social power."21 She believes that once 
domesticity is stripped of its prescriptive values, the creature Woman becomes 
the creator who carves domesticity in her own image. There is, however, a 
problem with the celebration of creativity, originality, vocation, and mastery 
implicit in Cott's version. While Cott brings women into the canon of historical 
behavior (individuals who shape their destiny), she simultaneously denies the 
power of ideology to generate distortions, contradictions, and omissions that 
would grant domesticity a false coherence. In other words, ideology fosters 
unconscious, unexamined, and conventional assumptions which may actually 
obscure the real conditions of women's material existence.22 Discourses that 
claim the authority of truth, as Foucault has argued, make it difficult to recognize 
the nexus between knowledge and power, because truth is viewed as divorced 
from power.23 Cott's attempt to understand domesticity on its "own terms" tends 
to elide these difficulties by treating discourse and ideology as vehicles that 
merely transmit ideas but do not create or determine the subjectivity of the 
individual. Furthermore, the dangerous or contradictory elements of domesticity 
are eliminated, because Cott gives the ideal of "woman's sphere" an internal logic 
and coherence through three crucial steps: first, the separation of spheres is 
spatialized through the division of home and work, and containment is reconfigured 
as the separate but equal formula in which women create their own subculture; 
second, the founding subject of Man is given a female counterpart who shares his 
creativity, but pursues different goals on her "own terms"; and third, ideology and 
false consciousness are sidestepped, since the private and psychic musings of 
women are treated as more authentic than public, prescriptive, and moralizing 
accounts of domesticity. 
Cott offers her "canon of domesticity" as an alternative to Welter's "cult of 
true womanhood," consciously writing against the tradition of women as victims. 
Yet Welter's essay, and Gerda Lerner's "The Lady and the Mill Girl," both of 
which Cott categorizes as examples of this victimization genre, are not really so 
simple or reducible when read as theoretical pieces.24 Welter's rather famous 
essay has gained the most notoriety for one passage: her list of the "four cardinal 
virtues" of true womanhood—"piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity."25 
While Kerber and others recognize Welter's adaption of Betty Friedan's argu-
ment from The Feminine Mystique, published three years earlier in 1963, less 
attention is paid to literary influences, especially the strong similarity between 
Welter and Mary Ellman's 1968 Thinking About Women. Like Welter, Ellman 
addresses the issue of how writers classify experiences through sexual analogy 
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and stereotypes, exposing what Toril Moi has described as "the ludicrous and 
illogical nature of this sexual mode of thought."26 Both Welter and Ellman use 
irony to highlight the instability of feminine stereotypes. Welter, for example, 
demonstrates how any discussion of female virtue is always contrasted to the 
countervailing notion of female vice, and that such oppositions apply to all the 
categories of true womanhood: submission is contrasted to superiority, piety to 
heresy and irréligion, purity to pollution, and domesticity to disorderly public 
behavior.27 Equally significant, Welter and Ellman both come to the conclusion 
that any stereotype "carrie[s] within itself the seeds of its own destruction," and 
they further imply that ideology has its own inherent limitations and gaps, so it 
does not necessarily comprise a unified whole.28 Gerda Lerner's 1969 article 
comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that the image of the "Lady" masked the 
inherent contradiction in the experience of the "Mill girl" who defied all the 
prescriptive virtues as a wage laborer, public actor, and unmarried woman outside 
the private sphere.29 Later evaluations of Welter's and Lerner's works miss their 
crucial insight about ideology, in part because stereotypes or contradictions are 
ignored rather than examined for their deeply political meaning. 
The evasion of ideology reached its pinnacle in Suzanne Lebsock's 1984 The 
Free Women of Petersburg, which views the antebellum concept of separate 
spheres as fostering "two standards, two scales of achievement, and two sets of 
values."30 Lebsock further argues that the cult of true womanhood was both 
"plausible" and "elastic," because it reflected the basic values of the female 
character identified through the personality traits of kindness, moral virtue, and 
religious devotion. Despite the similarity between Cott and Lebsock, they 
diverge in an important way: Cott treats domesticity as the path to individuality 
and gender identity, while Lebsock views it as a reflection of a core female 
identity which takes the form of what she calls "personalism." Furthermore, 
Lebsock rejects what she sees as the "feminist-whig tradition" of equating 
progress with feminism (and equality of the sexes), instead following the lead of 
scholars such as Carl Degler who dismiss the contribution of the nineteenth-
century women's rights movement. What makes Lebsock's work different is the 
degree to which she was influenced by Carol Gilligan' s 1982 book, In a Different 
Voice. By celebrating the "obvious differences" between men and women, 
Gilligan argued that women developed their values through relationships, "con-
textual thinking," and the ethic of care, while men relied on absolutes, abstract 
reasoning, and individual achievement. Lebsock's concept of "personalism" 
echoes this view, maintaining that antebellum women worked from a "personal 
frame of reference" rather than an abstract system of merit.31 
What is troubling about Lebsock's message is that it revives a version of 
female essentialism: women make personal decisions because they think like 
women. Her allies, particularly Carl Degler, defend an even more traditional 
essentialist standpoint: women are different because of their reproductive roles, 
and their attraction to domesticity, with its recognition of family and relation-
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ships, simply reflects the core reality of women's lives as mothers.32 For Lebsock, 
however, the canon or cult of domesticity is a pragmatic framework which 
operates on the level of common sense and thus is somehow divorced from the 
hegemonic consequences of power relations between men and women. Indi-
vidual women might suffer, survive, even subvert domesticity, but women as a 
group were destined to share similar values that allowed them to gain support 
from their female world of personal choice. Given the personal and practical 
nature of women's behavior, antebellum women were not submissive, pious, 
pure, and domestic because of patriarchy or ideology. Instead, the free women 
of Petersburg accepted their gender roles because in their daily lives such choices 
worked, made sense, and allowed them to achieve fundamentally different goals 
from men and thereby preserve a distinct women's culture. 
Lebsock's analysis therefore denies that ideology has any substantive power, 
except to compliment women's personal choices and decisions. There is little 
room for exploring either the negative consequences of domesticity or for 
considering how "personalism" cloaks social conventions by making them 
appear natural and sensible. Womanhood and sisterhood are combined in a false 
unity that is unmediated by ideology or discourse of any kind. There is a totalizing 
quality to Lebsock's interpretation that implies that domesticity can explain 
everything about women, even the most unlikely of actions such as their political 
behavior. Because her observations ignore the impact of ideology, the question 
remains: how does this synthetic approach account for the fragmented, if not 
conflicted, identities of women? 
Gender alone will not rescue such approaches, despite Joan Scott's faith in 
the rigorous development of gender as a new analytical category. Women's 
historians have not been misled by their analytical tools. The difficulty goes to 
the heart of historical scholarship, and the degree to which women's historians 
have or have not questioned the fundamental guidelines of history; namely, how 
do historians evade ideological questions by relying on identity and self-
recognition to center their narratives, and how do they use the concepts of 
originality, rationality, and free choice to ground their scholarly practice? 
Women's historians have been as likely as other historians to adhere to these 
conventions, and their use of theory has yielded mixed results. This is not because 
of any discomfort with theory, but because of the assumptions that are embedded 
in their theoretical choices. Welter and Lebsock offered different interpretations 
not simply because one highlighted victimization and the other personal choice. 
Instead, each has a different, theoretically informed perspective on ideology and 
power, and this in turn produced a radically different approach to history. 
Lebsock believed that she had uncovered the core identity and social reality of 
women which elevated the mundane over the ideal, while Welter wrote against 
the historical claim that the "cult of domesticity" ever constituted an unmediated 
reality for women. 
What women's historians need, then, is not a new concept or analytical 
category, but rather a culture of inquiry which enables us to transform our diffuse 
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and fragmentary evidence into discursive power. In order to achieve such a 
transformation, women's historians must strive to tell a different history in ways 
that are both theoretically sophisticated and yet persuasive to those of us who have 
been labelled—I hope with levity—as the theory impaired. Unfortunately, being 
persuasive has too often led historians—feminist and otherwise—to invent new 
metanarratives that are no less reductive than the ones they attempt to replace or 
correct. Though Scott offered "gender" as a corrective to the metanarratives of 
women's history, it has not succeeded in its task, primarily because its undevel-
oped critical edge allowed it to be subsumed into traditional descriptive histories. 
It remains to be seen how gender will operate in a poststructuralist setting, but one 
thing is clear: new concepts alone cannot eliminate the enduring ideological 
power of separate spheres. To dismantle the canon of domesticity, women's 
historians must avail themselves of the less fashionable but still indispensable 
resources of feminist practice. 
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